Organic Computing (OC) and Autonomic Computing (AC) systems are distinct from conventional systems through their ability to self-adapt and to self-organise. However, these properties are just means and not the end. What really makes OC and AC systems useful is their ability to survive in a real world, i.e. to recover from disturbances and attacks from the outside world. This property is called robustness. In this paper, we propose a metric to gauge robustness in order to be able to quantitatively compare the effectiveness of different self-organising and self-adaptive system designs with each other. In the following, we apply this metric to three experimental application scenarios and discuss their usefulness.
INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
Organic Computing ) (OC) (and Autonomic Computing (IBM, 2005) (AC)) systems are inspired by nature. They mimic architectural and behavioural characteristics, such as selforganisation, self-adaptation or decentralised control, in order to avoid a single point of failure and to achieve desirable properties like e.g. self-healing, self-protection, and self-optimisation. Moreover, OC and AC systems organise themselves bottom-up; this can eventually lead to the formation of macroscopic patterns from microscopic behaviours. Such "emergent" effects (Mnif and Müller-Schloer, 2006) can be beneficial or detrimental and have to be understood and controlled. It is a misconception, however, that the goal of building OC systems is primarily the construction of self-adaptive, emergent or self-organising systems. Self-organisation and self-adaptation are just means to make technical systems resistant against external or internal disturbances. It is also a misconception to assume that OC systems (or self-adaptive and selforganising systems in general) generally achieve a higher performance (e.g. higher speed) than conventional systems. OC systems are not per se faster than conventional systems but they return faster to a certain corridor of an acceptable performance in the presence of disturbances. The ultimate goal of OC systems is to become more resilient against disturbances and attacks from outside. We call this property "robustness".
In a variety of experiments in different application fields, such as wireless sensor networks (Kantert et al., 2016b) , open distributed grid-computing systems (Choi et al., 2008) , and urban traffic control Tomforde et al., 2010) , we have observed a characteristic behaviour of OC systems under attack1: They show a fast drop in utility after a disturbance (or an intentional attack), followed by a somewhat slower recovery to the original performance provided that there are suitable OC mechanisms (such as a learning observer/controller architecture Tomforde et al. (2011) ) in place. The exact characteristic of this utility drop and recovery curve is an important indicator for the effectiveness of the observer/controller mechanism. If we can quantify robustness, we can compare different observer/controller designs in terms of their ability to provide resilience to external disturbances.
The general idea for measuring robustness is to use the area of the characteristic utility degradation over time because this area captures the depth of the utility drop as well as the duration of the recovery. A degradation of zero corresponds to an ideally robust system. In a more detailed view, it is interesting to analyse the gradient of the drop phase and the bottom level of the degraded utility. These figures allow the characterisation of the so-called passive robustness. As soon as the recovery mechanisms are activated (usually this happens as fast as possible after the disturbance), the upward gradient of the utility is an indicator of the effectiveness of the system's active robustness. "Utility" is an application-specific metric.
It is used as a generalised term for the targeted effect of the system as defined by the user. It can be a speed (in case of robots or autonomous cars), a performance or throughput (in case of computing systems), or a transfer rate (in case of communication systems).
We have outlined a first draft of this robustness metric in (Kantert et al., 2016a) in a preliminary form. In this paper, we will review and refine this metric (Section II). In the following, we will apply it to a wireless sensor network (III), a desktop gridcomputing system (IV), and an urban traffic management system (V). Then, we will discuss its usefulness (VI) and conclude with a discussion of future work.
APPROACH -MEASURING ROBUSTNESS
In this approch, we extend our previous work (Kantert et al., 2016a) by classifying and quantifying the robustness.
Passive and Active Robustness
We assume a system S in an undisturbed state to show a certain target performance. More generally, we rate a system by a utility measure U, which can take the form of a performance or a throughput (in case of a computing system), a speed (in case of car), or any other application-specific metric. Typically, a system reacts to a disturbance by deviating from its target utility U target by ∆U. Passively robust systems, such as flexible posts or towers under wind pressure, react to the disturbance by a deflection ∆U = D x . This deflection remains constant as long as the disturbance remains. Active robustness mechanisms (such as self-organisation effected by a control mechanism like an observer/controller) counteract the deviation and guide the system back to the undisturbed state with ∆U = 0 or U target . If we want to quantify robustness (for comparison between different systems), we have to take into account the following observables:
1. The strength of the disturbance, z 2. The drop of the system utility from the acceptable utility U acc , ∆U, and 3. The duration of the deviation (the recovery time t rec − t z ).
We will introduce the developed method that takes all three aspects into consideration in the following part of this paper.
Measuring Robustness
We assume that it is generally feasible to measure the utility over time (at least from the point of view of an external observer). However, it is often hard to quantify the strength of a disturbance z. Therefore, depending on the application, an estimation of z is required for our model. Furthermore, the system has to know a target utility value U target (maybe the highest possible utility) and an acceptable utility value U acc (a minimal value where the system is still useful to the user). The goal of the model is to measure the response of a system to a certain disturbance in terms of its utility and compare it to other disturbances or systems.
In Figure 1 , we show an exemplary typical utility function U (t). In the beginning, U is at the target value U target . At time t z , a disturbance of strength z happens (displayed in green) and the utility (red) decreases. Once it drops below the acceptance threshold U acc at t cm , a control mechanism (CM) starts to intervene. At t low , U reaches U low,perm without an effective recovery mechanism and U low,cm if a control mechanism is acting against the impact of the disturbance. With a CM, U starts to recover at t rec and passes U acc at t acc . However, without a CM, U does not recover.
We can differentiate between two classes of behaviour during an attack: 1) An effective CM is started and the system recovers to at least U acc .
2) The system does not recover during attack (or during a disturbance).
Furthermore, we see two different types of behaviour when the attack ends at t z . Either (a) the utility reaches the same value as before the attack (here U target at t target ; solid red line in Figure 1 ), or (b) it stays at the same level as during the attack (dashed line). In total, this results in four different stereotypes of behaviour:
1a) The system S recovers during the attack to U ≥ U acc and returns to U ≥ U target when the attack ends. This is a strongly robust system. Figure 1: Utility degradation over time. At t z a disturbance with strength z occurs. The utility U drops. When it reaches U acc (i.e. a utility value that is mapped on the acceptance space of the considered system, see Schmeck et al. (2010) ), a control mechanism (CM) is activated for (1) which only decreases to U low,cm (i.e. the lowest utility value under presence of the control mechanism CM). At t rec , recovery starts and (1) passes U acc at t acc . For (2) no CM is activated and utility drops to U low,perm (with perm referring to a system-inherent permanent robustness level) and no recovery occurs. When the attack ends (a), the utility recovers U target eventually (i.e. it reaches the target space again, see Schmeck et al. (2010) ). If the attack prevails or did permanent damage to the system (b), utility may stay at a lower value. 1b) S recovers during the attack to U ≥ U acc and stays there when the attack ends. This is a weakly robust system. 2a) S does not recover during the attack but returns to the previous value after the attack ends. Such a system shows just a certain "elasticity", we call it partially robust. 2b) S does not recover during the attack, it stays at the low utility level U low,perm . Such a system is not robust at all.
While important, this only serves as a classification of different typical behaviours. However, to compare the effect of different disturbances z or different CMs, we have to quantify the utility degradation. We define the utility degradation D U as the area between a baseline utility (U baseline ) and U (t) for the time when U ≤ Uacc (see Equation 1):
First, we need to define a baseline U baseline for the measurement. This can be either hypothetical by using U target or U acc (in Figure 1) or we can run a reference experiment (as we will show later in Scenario 2, see Section 4). In order to maximise the system robustness, we have to minimise D U . A system, which never drops below U baseline apparently has maximal robustness. We define the robustness during attack R a as:
For each CM to be compared, we measure a utility degradation D U . This allows comparing the behaviour of two CMs during an attack (such as cases (1) and (2) from above) or the effectiveness of one CM for different attacks.
Furthermore, when the attack ended, we can measure the long-term utility degradation D U,long_term which is the area between U baseline and the actual U for the time after t z . This allows us to compare the cases (1a/2a) and (1b/2b) from above. Hence, the long-term robustness R l is defined as:
In cases where U (t) never reaches U target again, t target is ∞ (also U D is ∞) but we can calculate the open integral:
In all normal cases, R is assumed to be in the interval [0, 1]. It can never be negative and will only Quantitative Robustness âȂŞ A Generalised Approach to Compare the Impact of Disturbances in Self-organising Systems be larger than 1 if U (t) improves through the disturbance which happens only under very specific conditions (i.e. the system settled in a local optimum before the disturbance occurs, and is able to leave this local optimum as a result of the CM's intervention). Even if the utility U (t) never recovers, we get an asymptotic robustness value. However, values of R l with t target = ∞ are not comparable to values for R l with t target ∞ because the open integral would be always 1 in this case.
Related Work
The term "robustness" is widely used with different meanings in literature, mostly depending on the particular context or underlying research initiative. Typical definitions include the ability of a system to maintain its functionality even in the presence of changes in their internal structure or external environment (sometimes also called resilient or dependable systems) Callaway et al. (2000) , or the degree to which a system is insensitive to effects that have not been explicitly considered in the design Slotine et al. (1991) .
When especially considering engineering of information and communication technology-driven solutions, the term "robust" typically refers to a basic design concept that allows the system to function correctly (or, at the very minimum, not failing completely) under a large range of conditions or disturbances. This also includes dealing with manufacturing tolerances. Due to this wide scope of related work, the corresponding literature is immense, which is e.g. expressed by detailed reports that range back to the 90ies Taguchi (1993) . For instance, in the context of scheduling systems, robustness of a schedule refers to its capability to be executable -and leading to satisfying results despite changes in the environment conditions Scholl et al. (2000) . In contrast, the systems we are interested in (i.e. self-adaptive and self-organising OC systems) typically define robustness in terms of fault tolerance (e.g. Jalote (1994) ).
In computer networks, robustness is often used as a concept to describe how well a set of service level agreements are satisfied. For instance, Menasce et al. explicitly investigate the robustness of a web server controller in terms of workloads that exhibit some sort of high variability in their intensity and/or service demands at the different resources Menascé et al. (2005) .
More specifically and beyond these general definitions of the notion of robustness, we shift the focus towards quantification attempts. Only a few approaches known in literature aim at a generalised method to quantify robustness; in a majority of cases, selforganised systems are either shown to perform better (i.e. achieve a better system-inherent utility function) or react better in specific cases (or in the presence of certain disturbances), see e.g. ICAC (2015) and SASO (2015) . . In the following, we discuss the most important approaches to robustness quantification.
In the context of OC, a first concept for a classification method has been presented in Schmeck et al. (2010) . Here, the idea is (as in our approach) to take the system utility into account. Based on a predefined separation of different classes of goal achievement (i.e. distinguishing between target, acceptance, survival, and dead spaces in a state space model of the system S), the corresponding states are assigned to different degrees of robustness. Consequently, different systems are either strongly robust (i.e. not leaving the target space), robust (i.e. not leaving the acceptance space), or weakly robust (i.e. returning from the survival space in a defined interval). In contrast to our method, a quantitative comparison is not possible. In particular, this robustness classification does not take the recovery time into account.
Closely related is the approach by Nafz et al. presented in Nafz et al. (2011) , where the internal selfadaptation mechanism of each element in a superior self-organising system has the goal to keep the element's behaviour within a pre-defined corridor of acceptable states. Using this formal idea, robustness can be estimated by the resulting goal violations at runtime. Given that system elements have to obey the same corridors, this would also result in a comparable metric. Recently, the underlying concept has been taken up again to develop a generalised approach for testing self-organised systems, where the behaviour of the system under test has to be expressable quantitatively Eberhardinger et al. (2015) . However, this depends on the underlying state variables and invariants that are considered -which might be more difficult to assess at application level (compared to considering the utility function in our approach).
In contrast, Holzer et al. nodes are considered as stochastic automaton in a network and model the nodes' configuration as a random variable Holzer and de Meer (2011) . Based on this approach, they compute the level of resilience (the term is used there similarly to robustness in this paper) depending on the network's correct functioning in the presence of malfunctioning nodes that are again modelled as stochastic automatons Holzer and de Meer (2009) . In contrast to our approach, this does not result in a comparable metric and limits the scope of applicability due to the underlying modelling technique.
From a multi-agent perspective, Di Marzo Seru- Nimis and Lockemann (2004) . They model a multi-agent system as a layered architecture (i.e. seven layers from communication at the bottom to the user at the top layer). Of particular interest is the third layer, i.e. the conversation layer. The key idea of their approach is to treat agent conversations as distributed transactions. The system is then assumed to be robust, if guarantees regarding these transactions can be formulated. This requires technical prerequisites, i.e. the states of the participating agents and the environment must be stored in a database -this serves as basis for formulating the guarantees. Obviously, such a concept assumes hard requirements that are seldom available, especially not in open, distributed systems where system elements are not under control of a centralised element and might behave unpredictably.
To conclude this discussion, we can observe that a generalised approach to quantify robustness is needed that: (a) works on externally measurable values, (b) does not need additional information sources (e.g. transactional data-bases), (c) distinguishes between system-inherent (or passive) and system-added (or active) robustness (to allow for an estimation of the effectiveness of the particular mechanism) and (d) comes up with a measure that allows for a comparison of different systems for the same problem instance. We claim that our approach as outlined before fulfils all of these aspects. In order to demonstrate the effectiveness, we apply it to three different use cases in the following part of this paper.
APPLICATION SCENARIO 1: WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) consist of spatially distributed nodes which communicate over a radio interface. Nodes sense locally and send the result to the root node in the network. Since most nodes cannot reach root directly, other nodes have to relay packets. To find a path to root, the Routing Protocol for Lossy and Low Power Networks (RPL) (Winter et al., 2012 ) is used. The primary objective (O1) in such networks is to reach a high Packet Delivery Rate (PDR; ranges from 0 to 1). Since nodes are battery-powered, the secondary objective (O2) is to minimise the number of Transmitted Packets (#TX) because sending data over the air causes most power consumption in WSNs. These two objectives translate into two utility functions, which we have to investigate with respect to their robustness. Utility function 1 is PDR(t), utility function 2 is #TX(t).
In open distributed sensor networks, attacks by malicious or broken nodes can occur, which lead to poor PDR. To counter such threats, we introduced end-to-end trust in RPL in previous work (Kantert et al., 2016b) . In this trust-enhanced approach, the nodes assess the trustworthiness of their parents and isolate bad-behaving nodes. This constitutes a specific self-organised control mechanism CM. We are interested in a comparison of different variants of CMs: CM0 OF0. This is the default routing mechanism in RPL as described in (Winter et al., 2012) . It selects parents by the smallest rank.
CM1 Trust + ETX. Nodes use a trust metric to rate and isolate bad-performing parents. See (Kantert et al., 2016b ) for more details. The particular method is not of interest in the context of this paper, it serves as a representative for a more powerful, self-organised control mechanism.
CM2 Trust + ETX + Second Chance. This approach is similar to the previous one but also incorporates a mechanism to retry previously isolated parents occasionally (i.e. after re-stabilising the system, see again (Kantert et al., 2016b) for details). This approach serves as a representative with even more decision freedom of the CM.
In an undisturbed RPL network, our trustenhanced system implemented as CM1 behaves very similar to standard RPL (CM0). However, when an attack occurs, standard RPL looses numerous packets and PDR drops because it cannot handle (intentional or unintentional) malicious behaviour. When enabling our approach, nodes start to identify and isolate bad-behaving parents. Hence, the PDR recovers to nearly 100% (i.e. U target ) while the attack happens. Standard RPL only recovers after the attack ends (see Figure 2 ). is 87.7% better than CM0 and CM2 is 84% better than CM0. Also, CM1 has 23.5% smaller D U than CM2. The baseline is 1 (see Equation 2 ). R a for CM0 has a value of 70% (3), CM1 has a value of 91% (4) and CM2 has a value of 89%(5). For objective O1 (i.e. PDR(t)) CM1 recovers perfectly during the attack and returns to the same value as before the attack. Therefore, in this scenario, RPL with Trust + ETX is rated as strongly robust. However, this changes when we look at the second objective O2 represented by utility function 2: metric #TX(t) (the number of transmitted packets, see Figure 3) . When the attack starts, #TX drops for all CMs (which would be perfect if PDR stayed at a constant level). For Trust + ETX it increases to a higher level because the new routes are longer and require more transmissions. This is expected since some parents failed. However, after the attack ends, only standard RPL returns to its previous #TX. Trust + ETX stays at a high level. This is acceptable when dealing with intentional malicious attackers but this is bad when disturbances are only temporary. Therefore, Trust + ETX is not robust regarding the second utility function. Most energy in wireless sensor nodes is used when sending packets. Thus, to recover the energy consumption and #TX after an attack, we introduced TRUST + ETX + Second-Chance as a third control mechanism CM2 which retries parents when the system has stabilised (from a node's local perspective). This leads to a slight decrease of the PDR during the attack because nodes loose packets when retrying during an attack. However, after the attack the PDR is very similar and #TX recovers to its level from before the attack (see Figures 2 and 4) .
For O2, we measure D U only after the attack. Quantitatively, D U for CM1 is ∞ because it does not return to the previous values. For CM0 D U is about 0. CM2 needs some time to recover and has a D U of 1998.6. Thus, CM0 is the best metric when only considering O2 (since it is very bad for O1). In our robustness metric, we have to assume that a higher utility is better. In this case, the best utility for O2 would be a value of 0 (which is unrealistic). There-ICAART 2017 -9th International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence fore, we invert U (t) to get a utility function for the calculation of R l (see Equation 6 ). This results in a baseline U baseline of 43 (saved packets per second; see Equation 7). For CM1 this results in an asymptotic long-term robustness R l of 35% (8). CM2 recovers and has a robustness value R l of 47% (not comparable to CM1; Equation 9).
U baseline 120 − 77 = 43 packets s (7)
CM2 (TRUST + ETX + Second-Chance) is strongly robust for PDR. Also, it is robust regarding #TX. It does not recover during the attack (because better routes do not exist) but it recovers to the previous state when the attack ends.
APPLICATION SCENARIO 2: OPEN DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS
Another scenario we measured robustness in is the simulation of an open, distributed Multi-agent System with applied trust metrics, the Trusted Desktop Grid (TDG) (Edenhofer et al., 2015) . In this grid, jobs J are created by the agents and split into work units (WU), which are calculated in a distributed way by the agents. The success (or utility) is expressed as the speedup σ(t). σ(t) is defined as the time the agent would have needed to process all work units on its own (sel f ) divided by the real time it took to calculate the job in a distributed way in the system (dist), see Equation 10. A job J is released in time step t rel J and completed in t
In this scenario, our objective is to maximise the utility function speedup σ(t) (see Equation 10). Nodes make decisions based on a local trust metric and isolate bad-behaving agents using this Control Mechanism (CM1; see (Klejnowski, 2014) for details). We compare different attacks:
A0 No attack. Used as baseline.
A1 A short attack which ends at t z . is at its lowest. The speedup starts to recover (t rec ) during the attack until it reaches U acc (at t acc ). After the attack has stopped, the speedup returns to the level it had before for A1. However, it stays at about 10 for A2.
A2 Permanent attack which continues until the experiment ends. Additionally, we consider two different disturbances by stereo-type attacker behaviour:
D1 Egoistic agents (EGO) are accepting all WU, but abort 80% of them after some time, which decreases σ(t) because these WUs have to be redistributed. D2 Freeriding agents (FRE) do not accept WU at all. They reject WUs right away but try to distribute their WUs at the same time. For evaluation purposes, we investigated exemplary scenarios that incorporate disturbed system states. More precisely, we simulated 100 wellbehaving adaptive agents (ADA). At time t z , 100 badbehaving egoistic agents (EGO; D1) join the system, simulating a colluding attack. To show the effect of robustness in the system, we calculated the average speedup of 10 runs with a length of 200,000 ticks each. We want to compare the system behaviour (i.e. its robustness) under two different attacks. Attack A1 starts at tick 80,000 and lasts 40,000 ticks. Attack A2 is a continuous attack of 100 EGO starting at tick 80,000. As baseline, we ran the same experiment without an attack (A1; see Figure 5 ).
In both attacks (A1 and A2), the average speedup of the ADA during the attack of the EGO is decreased, due to the malevolent behaviour of the EGO. t low marks the point in time, where σ of the ADA is at its lowest. During the attack, once the average speedup of ADA increases by 5% (t rec ) over σ(t) at t low , the recovery phase is said to start; recovery is defined to be reached, if σ(t) is at least 75% (at t acc ) of σ(t) before the attack in t z .
In the first attack, after tick 120,000, the ADA have to redistribute the WUs formerly occupied by Quantitative Robustness âȂŞ A Generalised Approach to Compare the Impact of Disturbances in Self-organising Systems Figure 6 : Disturbance D2: Robustness in the TDG. Attack of 100 FRE from tick 80,000 to 120,000 (A1) and continuous from 80,0000 (A2) t low marks the point in time, where σ(t) is at its lowest. The speedup starts to recover (t rec ) during the attack and quickly reaches U acc and U target for both A1 and A2. At tick 120,000 A1 and A2 are the same because the attackers are fully isolated and have no further influence.
EGO. After these WUs have been successfully calculated, σ(t) recovers to the level it had before the attack. In both attacks, σ(t) of the ADA recovers during the attack until it reaches the acceptance space (i.e. system states where the utility is above U acc ). This is due to the EGOs getting low trust ratings because they abort their assigned WUs. Yet, they manage to retain a high enough reputation to still get some WUs computed by other agents. As 80% of the WUs held by EGOs have to be redistributed, σ(t) of the ADA cannot recover to the level it had before the attack.
Quantitatively, D U is 130,105 below the baseline for both A1 and A2. After the attack, D U is 6250 for A2. D1 has a permanent influence and CM1 is not able to fully mitigate the effect. We measured the baseline utility U baseline in a reference experiment. R a for A1 and A2 is with 72% (see Equation 11 ). Similar to, O2 in Scenario 1, only A2 fully recovers. For A1, we calculate R l in an open integral in Equation 12. Again, not comparable, R l for A2 can be calculated in a closed integral (see Equation 13 ; the open integral would have a value of 1).
349, 895 480, 000 ≈ 73% (11)
113, 750 120, 000 ≈ 95%
Similarly, we run experiments for disturbance D2 with free-riding agents (see Figure 6 ). Since those agents are simpler to detect, they are isolated within the attack period of A1 and the system fully recovers to U target within the attack. U D is 13, 056 for both A1 and A2 during the attack. After the attack ends, A1 is already fully recovered and the utility for A1 and A2 is similar. CM1 is able to fully mitigate this disturbance D2. R a is 97% (see Equation 14). Since U (t) fully recovers for both attacks, R l is about 100% for A1 and A2.
R a,D2
466, 944 480, 000 ≈ 97% (14)
APPLICATION SCENARIO 3: URBAN TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT
A third scenario that is often used as basis to investigate a self-organisation mechanism due its inherent dynamics and distributed nature is the control of traffic lights in urban areas, see (Bazzan and Klügl, 2009; Dinopoulou et al., 2006) for instance. One of the major OC-based contributions in this context is the Organic Traffic Control (OTC) system that applies the observer/controller approach as well as an autonomous and safety-oriented learning process to the traffic domain. In OTC, each intersection of the inner-city road network is managed by an observer/controller instance that gathers detector data about the underlying traffic conditions (in terms of flows passing each turning movement) and reacts by adapting green durations. The success of the control strategy is typically expressed as flow-weighted delays:
Where M i corresponds to the current traffic flow at the i-th turning of the observed intersection and t d,i denotes the average waiting time with respect to a single turning t i . This metric is also referred to as Level of Service (LoS) Transportation Research Board (2000). In addition, the same metric is used to determine the most promising progressive signal system Tomforde et al. (2010) . Adapting traffic signalisation to changing demands and coordinating intersection controllers provides a first step towards robustness -but this does not dissolve the initial disturbance. In terms of the previously developed notion, this accounts as passive robustness. Re-routing of traffic participants counters the disturbance (i.e. a blocked road or traffic jams) directly and can be considered as active robustness mechanism in this context. In previous work, we equipped OTC with such a mechanism Prothmann et al. (2012) . Based on ideas resembling the Link State or Distance Vector Routing ICAART 2017 -9th International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence protocols as known from the computer networks domain (Tanenbaum, 2002) , information about the shortest routes are exchanged between intersection controllers and provided to drivers at each incoming intersection, see Prothmann et al. (2011 Prothmann et al. ( , 2012 ation has been cona simulated network lustrated in Fig. 1 . rk consists of three -type sub-networks. It 7 signalised intersecicted as circles) and ent destinations (deiamonds). Within each k, the intersections are by one-laned road seg-50 m length that proditional turning lanes m before an intersection. Regions are connected by two-laned roads. d intersections are operated by an observer/controller (see Sect. 3) ovide route recommendations for the prominent destinations. Each also serves as origin for traffic entering the network. Two scenarios ated: regular scenario, eight vehicles per hour travel from every origin to estination. In total, 6048 vehicles traverse the network in every hour.
is demand does not cause significant jams at the network's interseche scenario allows to evaluate the impact of DRG under uncongested ns. It is simulated for a period of three hours. incident scenario, the same amount of traffic traverses the network. r, one of the roads connecting two sub-networks is temporarily blocked an incident (see Fig. 1 ). The blockage affects both directions of the ccurs after 15 minutes and lasts for 20 minutes within the two hour ion period. The incident scenario allows to evaluate the benefit of the presence of disturbances.
rature reports a widely varying driver acceptance for VMS-based mendations [4, 5] , acceptance rates of 0.125 (low), 0.375 (medium), Figure 7 : An exemplary model of 27 intersections (depicted as grey circles), forming three connected Manhattan-style road networks. Traffic enters and leaves the network at locations referred to as destinations (depicted as light-grey diamonds). In the evaluation, the red road is blocked during attack A1.
In this scenario, the objective is to maximise the utility function traffic flow which can be measured globally. At t z , one road is blocked until t z (attack A1, red road in Figure 7) . We compare three different control mechanisms:
CM0 No active control mechanism. Used as baseline.
CM1 OTC without routing.
CM2 OTC with routing.
The evaluation has been conducted for a simulated network that is illustrated in Figure 7 . The network consists of three Manhattan-type sub-networks. It contains 27 signaled intersections (depicted as circles) and 28 prominent destinations (depicted as diamonds). Within each sub-network, the intersections are connected by one-laned road segments of 250m length that provide two additional turning lanes starting 100m before an intersection. Regions are connected by two-laned roads. Signalised intersections are operated by an observer/controller (i.e. OTC) and can provide route recommendations for the prominent destinations. Each destination also serves as origin for traffic entering the network.
We configured the simulation as follows: eight vehicles per hour travel from every origin to every destination. Since this demand does not cause significant jams at the network's intersections, the scenario allows evaluating the impact of routing mechanisms under uncongested conditions. As disturbance, we temporarily blocked one of the roads connecting two sub-networks due to an incident (see mark in Figure 7 ). The blockage affects both directions of the road, occurs after 25 min and lasts for 40 min within the simulation period. The incident scenario allows analysing the impact of the two different adaptation mechanisms (CM1 = OTC without routing, and CM2 = OTC with routing) in comparison to a standard fixed-time control approach (= CM0).
Within the professional simulator Aimsun Barceló et al. (2005) , we performed five runs of experiments for each instance under evaluation and computed averages. Figure 8 depicts the achieved results. We can clearly observe that the typical system behaviour of a disturbed and recovering system is visible in this scenario. When considering the OTC system without routing in comparison to a standard fixed-time control, we can distinguish two effects: a) the fixed-time controller (i.e. CM0) defines the base-line (i.e. the maximum loss of utility) and b) the standard OTC system (CM1) already provides a permanent robustness increase that improves the behaviour even if no disturbance takes place. If activating the routing mechanism (CM2), an active robustness is added. Quantitatively, U D for CM1 is about 5.4% better than the reference solution (CM0) figure) . Hence, the robustness is achieved at network-level, since participants are routed using the best available link (i.e. with routing mechanism, CM2) or at least the non-affected participants benefit due to longer green durations (i.e. a blocked road receives a lower fraction of the phase cycle time when using OTC, CM1 and CM2). With this mechanism at hand, we are now able to compare the developed Quantitative Robustness âȂŞ A Generalised Approach to Compare the Impact of Disturbances in Self-organising Systems 
DISCUSSION
We demonstrated that our approach is applicable to three varying scenarios from different application domains. In Scenario 1, we compared three different control mechanisms with two different objective functions for wireless sensor networks. The resulting values are reasonable and allow for a simple and effective comparison of robustness levels for the considered CMs. In Scenario 2, we compared two different attack types and two different disturbances in a grid scenario. We measured the long-term influence for the disturbances and found that only one of the disturbances has a permanent effect. Afterwards, in Scenario 3, we measured the robustness for three CMs in a traffic management scenario. The general shape of the utility graph was very similar in all our scenarios. Still, the utility degradation U D is not comparable between scenarios because it has an application specific unit (i.e. it is hard to compare apples and oranges). However, our robustness metrics R a and R l are unit free and always have the same boundaries. Thus, they allow some comparison between different systems.
Nevertheless, some limitations apply: We have to set a fixed attack length t z − t z . This limits the applicability of the concepts to those cases where a disturbance is observable in the first place. Current research addresses this topic by developing techniques to deal with this issue. Also, it influences the value of R as illustrated by Scenario 2. If we had set t z , earlier the robustness R a for both CMs would be lower. A similar challenge occurs when calculating R l for two CMs which reach U target at different times. To make their robustness R l values comparable, a later t target has to be chosen. This issue can be solved but it requires some caution when designing experiments.
We noticed another challenge when calculating R l for O2 in Scenario 1 because our goal was to minimise the metric. However, for a utility function U (t) a higher value should be better. Hence, we had to invert the objective function to calculate the utility. There is no need to normalise the utility function but larger values must be better which is important to keep the robustness values inside the interval between 0 and 1.
Finally, we saw in Scenario 1 that it is crucial to choose the right utility function. If we only consider O1, A1 has the best robustness. However, if we also take into account O2, A2 is clearly better. The remaining challenge here is to properly combine multiple metrics.
In future work, we will focus on quantitatively comparing similar mechanisms in different application scenarios. Also, we would like to extend the selection of integration limits for better comparison.
CONCLUSION
Self-adaptation and self-organisation are concepts increasingly incorporated in system design. This is ICAART 2017 -9th International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence mostly due to one key motivation: We want to improve the robustness of technical systems in terms of a utility preservation in order to maintain the system's functionality even under harsh external conditions or the presence of internal failures (we refer to such effects in general as disturbances). Hence, one of the most important aspects to judge whether one specific solution is more beneficial than another is to estimate which system is more robust. Such a decision process needs a quantitative basis to come up with a meaningful statement. In this paper, we presented a novel method that estimates such a measurement at runtime.
We discussed the state-of-the-art and explained that existing approaches have drawbacks, e.g. requiring too much internal information, measuring only certain aspects (such as the time), being applicationspecific, or abstracting the robustness too far (i.e. coming up with a discretisation of a few classes only). With our method, we focus on externally measurable attributes only and allow for a generalised concept for comparing robustness. We further distinguish between a permanent part of robustness that is system inherent and a part that is generated by internal adaptation mechanisms. We demonstrated the expressiveness of the developed approach in terms of three case studies, i.e. from the desktop grid, the wireless sensor network, and the traffic control domains.
In future work, we will investigate how our method behaves when comparing different systems within the same application domain. In addition, we focus on questions regarding the heterogeneity of occurring disturbances: Where are the drawbacks and advantages of the developed technique and what needs to be improved to come up with a fully generally applicable method?
